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Each time I tried to do a piece of theoretical work, it had as its starting
point elements of my own experience and was always in relation to
processes that I saw going on around me. It's because I thought I could
recognize in the things I saw, in the institutions that I was dealing with,
in my relations with others, some cracks, mute tremors, malfunc-
tionings, that I undertook a particular piece of work - some fragments
of autobiography.'
Each of us, of course, thinks and writes on the basis of our own experi-
ences and in relation to what each of us sees going on. Several years ago I
attended a paper presentation at a conference, after which a member of the
audience responded critically to the presenter with the remark, "Your paper
tells me more about you than the topic you addressed." Not surprisingly,
perhaps, the theme of the conference was psychoanalysis and the respondent
an analyst (thus, the joke about two analysts meeting on the street, one
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. This Article is based on an
address presented at the Washington and Lee School of Law on March 28, 1997, in connection
with the Lacan and the Subject of Law Symposium.
1. Interview by Didier Eribon with Michel Foucault, in Est-il donc important de
penser?, LIBRATION, May 30-31, 1981, quoted and translated in DAVID M. HALPERIN,
SAiNT FOUCAULT: TowARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 234 n.61 (1995).
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saying, "Hello, how am I today?" and the other answering, "Fine, how about
me?"). Nevertheless, while a scholarly paper on any topic should reveal
something more than the scholar herself, some degree of self-revelation is
inevitable. Indeed, the turn to personal narratives in legal scholarship is
theoretically justified as an acknowledgment that we are each socially situ-
ated and constructed, that we each have a history, and so forth.
I like the texts of Jacques Lacan, and I think that his theory of the
human subject is both compelling and useful in the analysis of legal pro-
cesses and institutions. If I did not like Lacan's texts, I might nevertheless
have written Lacan and the Subject ofLaw,2 but the subtitle would have been
something like "A Useless Enterprise" (there is an industry in, and impliedly
a market for, books criticizing Lacan). Similarly, if I spent as much time
reading Foucault as I have Lacan, this conference might be titled "Foucault
and the Subject of Law." My point is not simply the obvious one that I did
study Lacan (and not Foucault) and that I became a Lacanian (and not an
anti-Lacanian), but also that my interest in Lacan says something about me
and not just about Lacanian theory. Norman Holland, a critic of Lacan,
actually suggests, quite rudely I think, that Lacanian theory is attractive to
some because it allows one to do anything (immoral) one wants.3 While that
point is not well taken, Lacan's notion of the subject as constituted in sym-
bolic and imaginary relations - through networks of language and by
identifying with other people - does imply that I am not a wholly rational
and autonomous subject freely exercising my objective preferences. Rather,
I am positioned in such a way that Lacanian theory is attractive. And,
moving from self-criticism to social criticism, everyone else is positioned in
ways that matter when they hear about Lacan.
In Part I below, I discuss the recent opinion by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Cohen v. Brown University4 because I
think it is a very Lacanian analysis of Title IX's requirement of gender
equity in college athletics.' I use the word "Lacanian" loosely, as Terry
Eagleton did in referring to a Lacanian Irish Rebel song,6 to refer to the
2. DAVID S. CAUDILL, LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LAW: ToWARD A PSYCHOANA-
LYTIC CRmICAL LEGAL THEORY (1997).
3. See NORMAN HOLLAND, THE CRITICAL I 199 (1992). Holland wrote: "I once asked
a graduate student why he liked Lacan so much. He replied: 'It means I am not responsible
for anything, not society, not my words, not me. Also, it helps me get girls.'" Id.
4. 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
5. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469
(1997).
6. See TERRY EAGLETON, HEATHCLIFF AND THE GREAT HUNGER: STUDIES IN IRISH
CULTURE 142 (1995) ("When we were savage, fierce and wild/She came like a mother to her
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court's conclusion that evidence of women's lack of interest in sports must
be viewed with suspicion: rather than indicating a lack of discrimination
against women's sports programs, the lack of interest may signal the "histori-
cal lack of opportunities to participate in sports."7 The Cohen opinion
provides an opportunity not only to consider the relevance of Lacanian
theory for the types of problems that arise in law, but also to describe certain
aspects of Lacanian theory as background for the remainder of this essay.
In Part H, I consider the question of why I chose, in my book on Lacan,
to begin with a catalog of criticisms of Lacan - with what one reviewer
called a "tone of slightly embarrassed defense."' The reasons I give may end
up saying more about me than about Lacan, but that too becomes a very
Lacanian exercise in legal scholarship.
L Lacan, Law, and Women in Sports
Class, race, gender, hegemony, imperialism, ritual, liminality, sex and
discourse! Everyone's favorite analytical instruments - and never more
useful than in the interpretation of England's national game, cricket .... 9
Sport is a mirror of many things. It illuminates political, social, eco-
nomic and legal systems."0
This academic year, as I was preparing for this symposium, my teach-
ing assignments included Contracts, Law and Psychology, Professional
Responsibility, and Sports Law. The law school administration here at
Washington and Lee University - and this is likely not unique - encour-
ages each member of the faculty to engage in scholarship related to his or
her teaching, for the obvious reason that students will benefit from being
taught by scholars in their respective teaching fields. This is not a written
directive, but it's part of the culture here. In my appropriation of Lacan for
law, I have described in earlier publications the relevance of Lacan for three
of my courses this year: for contracts (with respect to legal interpretation),"'
child/And gently raised us from the slime .... "). Eagleton indicates displaced rage and
compliance as a way of not complying with a mother (England) who misconceives a child's
(Ireland's) need for recognition. Id.
7. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 179.
8. See Costas Douzinas, Psychoanalysis Becomes the Law: Notes on an Encounter
Foretold, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 323, 325 (1996).
9. Patrick Allitt, English Cricket and Literature, 95 S. ATL. Q. 385, 385 (1996).
10. Colin Tatz, Racism and Sport in Australia, RAcE & CLAss, Apr.-June 1995, at 43,
43.
11. See generally David S. Caudill, Lacan andLegal Language: Meanings in the Gaps,
Gaps in the Meanings, 3 LAW & CRITQUE 169 (1992).
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for professional responsibility (with respect to Lacanian ethics),12 and for law
and psychology (with respect to the presumed subject of law). 3 I did not
expect Lacan to be relevant for Sports Law, until I read the Cohen opinion
decided Nov. 21, 1996. For anyone interested in psychoanalytic jurispru-
dence, the gender discrimination claim in Cohen has it all: surface conscious-
ness, hidden unconscious, culturally mediated desires, collective repression,
refusal to submit to symbolic conventions, bodies colonized by language, and
conflict between biological nature and cultural subjectivity. Sports and
Culture theorists have for years argued that there is more going on in athletic
events, in terms of social production and reproduction, than meets the eye,
and the First Circuit has now validated that sub-discipline at the margins of
sociology, cultural studies, and psychology.
Cohen v. Brown University, a class action brought by student members
of the women's gymnastics and volleyball teams, involved an allegation of
Title IX violations by the university in demoting those teams from university-
funded varsity status to donor-funded varsity status.' 4 The district court's
finding of Title IX violations was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, but was remanded for reconsideration of the appropriate
remedy." The major issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of the so-
called three-part test used to determine compliance with Title IX's require-
ment for equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.' 6 Briefly, the
three-part test inquires as to:
(1) whether participation opportunities for male and female students are
provided in substantial proportion to their respective enrollments;
(2) where one sex is underrepresented, whether the institution can
show a history and continuing practice of program expansion responsive to
developing interest and abilities of members of that sex; or
(3) where there is underrepresentation and no showing of program
expansion, whether the institution can demonstrate that the interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively accom-
modated by the present program.1
7
12. See generally David S. Caudill, Lacanian Ethics and the Desire for Law, 16
CARDOZO L. REv. 793 (1995).
13. See generally David S. Caudill, Pierre Schlag's "The Problem of the Subject": Law's
Need for an Analyst, 15 CAanOZO L. REV. 707 (1993).
14. Cohenv. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 161 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1469 (1997).
15. Id. at 188.
16. Id. at 166.
17. Id.
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Brown University could not satisfy the first two prongs 18 and attempted
to meet the third prong by arguing that "the gender-based disparity in
athletics participation opportunities at Brown is due to a lack of interest on
the part of its female students, rather than to discrimination, and any attempt
to remedy the disparity is, by definition, an unlawful quota."' 9 That ap-
proach, the Cohen majority found, is entirely contrary to federal mandates
and makes it virtually impossible "to eliminate sex discrimination in intercol-
legiate athletics. "
Brown University's argument that "women are less interested than men
in participating in intercollegiate athletics" ignored "the fact that Title IX was
enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped
notions of women's interests and abilities."21 Significantly, Brown Univer-
sity offered "statistical evidence purporting to reflect women's interest," but
that evidence "instead provide[d] only a measure of the very discrimination
that is and has been the basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate
in sports."'
Interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a
function of opportunity and experience ....
... We conclude that, even if it can be empirically demonstrated
that, at a particular time, women have less interest in sports than do
men, such evidence, standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer
athletic opportunities for women than for men.23
The link between lack of interest and lack of opportunity was made
explicit by the court. Brown University, in effect, argued that the two are
unrelated by relying on evidence of interest alone, which seems consistent
with the language of the third prong of the three-part test?5 The court,
however, noted that the Policy Interpretation (issued by the U.S. Department
of Education's Office of Civil Rights in 1979) that sets forth the three-part
test requires institutions to take into account "the nationally increasing levels
of women's interests and abilities" in athletics.' Since that phenomenon is
18. Id. at 175.
19. Id. at 176.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 178-79.
22. Id. at 179.
23. Id. at 179-80.
24. Id. at 178.
25. Id. at 179 n.15 (quoting Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417 (1979)).
1079
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1075 (1997)
attributable in part to Title IX,2 the link between interest and opportunity is
established. Brown University's approach "contravenes the purpose of [Title
IX and its regulations] . . . to remedy a gender-based disparity in . . .
opportunities" and actually "freezes that disparity by law, thereby disadvan-
taging further the underrepresented gender. "27
This train of thought might lead quickly to the conclusion that our
expressed interests, our conscious desires, may not be genuinely "ours" -
they are fabricated or socially constructed by a history of opportunities and
experience. That is, Brown University's women who answered a question-
naire about interest in athletics are not the presumed, free and autonomous,
subjects of law. Rather, they are split subjects with surface interests (written
on the questionnaires after they have been written by social conventions on
the subject, the former being only a recording of the latter) and with re-
pressed interests (erased by social conventions). The purpose of Title IX is
to change the social conventions that have reduced opportunities and experi-
ences. The purpose of legal analysis under Title IX is only indirectly to
"treat" the student athlete by revealing those with whom she identifies and
by tracing the societal expectations and narratives that structure her desires.
More directly, the court engaged in social psychoanalysis by identifying the
"traditional myth that women aren't interested in sports"' and by showing
the "lack of interest defense" to be an "instrument of further discrimina-
tion, "29 neither of which were obvious in the statistical interpretation of the
questionnaires. As in clinical psychoanalysis, the patient, here the univer-
sity, would not be blamed for intentional discrimination. Brown University
did not force or teach its women to eschew sports. Rather, the university
failed to recognize, in Foucault's terms, that "power is everywhere. "3
Modem liberalism has eliminated certain modes of domination only to
produce many others (which do not present themselves as modes of domina-
tion and are all the more difficult to challenge or oppose); it has champi-
oned an ethic and an ideal of personal freedom while maldng the exercise
of that freedom conditional upon personal submission ... to mechanisms
of constraint.31
26. Id. at 180 (citing Mike Tharp et al., Sports Crazy! Ready, Set, Go. Why We Love
Our Games, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 15, 1996, at 30, 33-34 (attributing explosive




30. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HIsTORY OF SExuALrrY, VOLUME I: AN INTRODUC-
TION 93 (R. Hurley trans., 1978).
31. HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 19.
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The deeply internalized "mechanisms of constraint" become the field of
psychoanalysis, which is where the court in Cohen was headed.
That train of thought, however, was soon derailed in the opinion be-
cause the specific facts of the case rendered the lack-of-interest argu-
ments inconsequential.32 Brown was eliminating varsity level teams where
interest and ability already existed, so the entire staging of psychoanalytic
inquiry was somewhat beside the point. The dissenting judge, however,
immediately recognized the danger of the majority's inquiry: "[I]t is inevita-
ble [in Title IX disputes] that statistical evidence will be relevant. There is
simply no other way to assess participation rates, interest levels, and abili-
ties. ,"
Moreover, the majority approvingly cites statistics regarding propor-
tionality of women's participation in sports, but then becomes critical of
statistics on the issue of interest.3 If the latter statistics simply reflect past
discrimination, then what indicators should be used? The dissent stated that
"the majority rejects the best - and perhaps the only - mechanism for
making" a showing of lack of interest.3" In short, there is no way for a
university to determine Title IX compliance (under the third prong) without
such surveys.36 If you cannot believe the speaking subject, then who can you
believe?
One of Lacan's most controversial procedures in his own psychoanalytic
practice was the so-called "short session." Briefly, on the basis that very
little of the speaking subject's words are to be believed, Lacan would cut
short the analytic session when the ego started to lie, when the unconscious
was no longer speaking. 7 If the majority opinion in Cohen demonstrates the
promise of psychoanalytic jurisprudence, the dissenting opinion demonstrates
how problematical psychoanalysis is for law. Pierre Legendre, whose work
32. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 180.
33. Id. at 197 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. Chief Judge Torruella's revelation of the majority's selective use of statistics
confirms the findings of Charles Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark Lepper. Id. "People who hold
strong opinions on complex social issues are likely to examine relevant empirical evidence in
a biased manner. They are apt to accept 'confirming' evidence at face value while subjecting
'disconfirming' evidence to critical examination." Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,
37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979). Of course, that study is itself
empirical evidence.
35. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 198 (Torruella, C.J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. See STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LACAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL
HERO 132-42 (1983).
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in the genealogy of legal institutions is psychoanalytic and Lacanian in
orientation, highlights a difficulty in integrating psychoanalysis into law
"because ... this notion of the unconscious ... seems to contradict the
whole idea of knowledge."38 The "order of causality discovered by Freud,"
the genealogical construction of the subject, and the determinism of the
symbolic order of language, fundamentally challenge the discourse of reason
and the "representation of choice [that] presides over this construction. 09
I mention Legendre and his notion that introducing psychoanalysis into law
requires something on the order of a revolution to explain how I deal with
psychoanalytic jurisprudence. Cohen does less to show how relevant psy-
choanalysis is for law than to show how problematical, even traumatic,
psychoanalysis can be.
II. In Defense of[My Defense of] Lacan
So let me make it official. I may not have worshiped Foucault at the
time I wrote One Hundred Years of Homosexuality, but I do worship him
now. As far as I'm concerned, the guy was a [expletive deleted] saint.
40
I do not think Jacques Lacan was a saint. Despite my admiration for
Lacanian theory, and my tendency for intellectual hagiography (as in intel-
lectual biography), I am not concerned to defend his personal life, nor do I
think such a defense is necessary to the appropriation of Lacan for law.
Nevertheless, rumors about Lacan circulate, 41 and I cannot help but be
defensive. Apart from Lacan's personal idiosyncracies, theoretical contro-
versies surround Lacanian theory as well. To the extent that faculties in
most disciplines nowadays are divided over the so-called postmodern cri-
tiques of traditional or mainstream (though in some disciplines postmodern-
ism has become mainstream) theory, one must be careful not to be catego-
rized and dismissed by one side or the other in one's writing. However, I
find fascinating the capacity of Lacanian theory to offend postmodernists and
traditionalists all at once, a phenomenon that exacerbates the problem of
persuasion for a Lacanian. That might sound like academic whining or like
an adoption of victim-like status (postmoderns and traditionalists both claim
38. Pierre Legendre, The Other Dimension of Law, 16 CARDozo L. RIv. 943, 957
(1995).
39. Id. at 944.
40. HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 6.
41. See ELISABmTH ROUDINESCO, JACQUES LACAN 18 (1997) (Lacan's arrogance); id.
at 75-79 (unfaithfulness); id. at 161 (insensitivity); id. at 180-85 (misogyny, favoritism); id.
at 196, 205, 387 (unethical acts); id. at 303 (rudeness); id. at 329, 377-79 (susceptibility to
rages); id. at 389, 397 (greediness).
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marginal status in contemporary theory wars), but my sense is that Lacan is
particularly risky. Add the facts that Lacan is a Freudian and that we are in
an era of Freud-bashing in the academic and popular press, and a Lacanian
theorist might become defensive.
My own defensiveness is apparently evident in Lacan and the Subject
of Law, as highlighted by Costas Douzinas in his review of my book.42 I
should confirm at the outset that I appreciate that review, which I think is
fair. My response below is not in the genre of an angry author's letter to the
editor of the London Review of Books ("Did your reviewer even read my
book?"; "Does your reviewer ever read any books?"; "Can your reviewer
read?"; etc.). I simply think the review provides an opportunity to explore
the question of how best to present interdisciplinary scholarship in the
context of legal academe. I hope not to embarrass myself (or Professor
Douzinas) by writing a "Reply to My Critics" essay too soon, with only one
critic, or to appear overly defensive by reacting strongly to the first review.
However, the issue raised in the review is the propriety of my defensiveness
about Lacan as well as the manner in which that defensiveness structures or
dictates how I present Lacan.
A. Rhetorics of Modesty
[Caudill's Lacan and the Subject of Law attempts] to introduce Lacanian
psychoanalysis to the Law School and to make it relevant to the doc-
trinal and theoretical concerns of legal education ... , an admittedly
Herculean task [that leads Caudill to adopt] a certain apologetic tone
about the difficulties one faces in dealing with the convoluted thought
and occasionally extravagant linguisticeries of Lacan. Chapter 1 cap-
tures this tone of slightly embarrassed defense.43
Professor Douzinas's critical observation - that I open my argument
for Lacan's relevance to law with a strikingly defensive tone - is not
surprising to me. I have heard it before, both from publishers' referees and
from my law faculty colleagues who point out that a lawyer should know
better than to begin an argument with a catalog of challenges to a not-yet-
explicated position. My goal in this paper is to reflect upon why I chose that
approach, that is, on what there is about Lacan and about me that might
explain my "tone of slightly embarrassed defense."'
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Of course, I worry about writing a scholarly paper that is not primar-
ily about Lacan or law, but rather is about me. My first reaction is to
apologize, but then I would be doing the same thing of which Douzinas was
critical. My second reaction is to note, along with Douzinas, that legal
scholarship often effaces or forgets the emotional aspect of law - our
passions and "personal experiences, our history with its traumas and symp-
toms."45 To the extent that psychoanalysis is associated with subjectivity,
with unconscious desire below the surface of conscious speech, a paper on
Lacanian psychoanalytic jurisprudence arguably should begin with self-
analysis, with unedited free associations that reveal doubts and fears about
one's own importance and about the importance of Lacan. Indeed, Lacan
warned analysts never to forget that knowledge is characterized by a certain
forgetfulness of its origins, its constitution, its creative function. 46 Science,
for example, "has no memory. Once constituted, it forgets the circuitous
path by which it came into being; otherwise stated, it forgets the dimension
of truth that psychoanalysis seriously puts to work. " The error "that what
science constitutes ... has always been true, that it is given," "exists in all
knowledge."48 Thus, I might also argue that all legal scholarship, and not
just mine, should begin with a self-analytical acknowledgment of subjectiv-
ity, of a personal history with emotional attachments and investments.
Douzinas, after identifying my tone of slightly embarrassed defense,
offers his own interpretation of my strategy. Because of my concern that I
might appear to be an uncritical, fanatical disciple of Lacan, of which there
are many, I present the evidence for and against Lacan as if to let the reader
decide for herself, as if I am not interested. Moreover, because of my con-
cern that legal academics are suspicious and reluctant regarding psychoanaly-
sis, I argue that Lacan offers helpful insights, as if I see little hope for a
thorough-going psychoanalytic jurisprudence. I think Douzinas is right -
because of its controversial and complex features, Lacanian theory is a hard
sell, and to proceed otherwise would be risky. Moreover, psychoanalytic
theory in any form is a hard sell nowadays. Interdisciplinary work in
general is not so difficult to introduce, but the discipline of law is always
hesitant to yield turf to outsiders, especially if they appear radical or other-
45. Id. at 323.
46. JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK II: THE EGO IN FREUD's
THEORY AND IN THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, 1954-1955, at 19 (Jacques-Alain
Miller ed. & Sylvana Tomaselli trans., 1991).
47. Jacques Lacan, Science and Truth (1965), reprinted in 3 NEWSL. FREUDIAN FIELD
17-18 (1989).
48. Id. at 17.
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wise nontraditional. A certain modesty and defensiveness thus seems to be
in order.
A less flattering interpretation of my "tone of embarrassed defense,"
which could only be made by someone familiar with my personal history,
might be that I have a pathological attraction to causes that require embar-
rassed defenses. In high school speech competitions, I argued in favor of
pacifism, and the defense I gave of my position several nights a week to my
father, a career Air Force veteran, was always slightly embarrassed. My
embarrassment receded in my university years when protests against the
Vietnam War were common, but returned when I joined the Air Force to fly
fighter jets. Later, in graduate school, I adopted a tone of slightly embar-
rassed defense because I was interested in Christian philosophy. Following
law school, in law practice, I became interested in critical legal studies, and
my tone among fellow lawyers was always one of slightly embarrassed
defense. As a law professor, I have written in defense of the legal position
of creation science advocates and in defense of land-use developers who
challenge environmental regulations, both of which required in academic
culture a certain level of embarrassment. Dealing with a controversial
thinker like Lacan is, therefore, not unlike many of my prior projects.
B. Rhetorics of Immodesty
Others who have been inspired by Lacan, however, are less modest and
defensive in appropriating or arguing for Lacanian theory. Ellie Ragland,
for example, whose Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis49 was one
of the earliest and most widely-read introductions to Lacan, is much less
defensive about Lacan. Her book, we might say, is properly organized, with
powerful arguments at the beginning and defenses to criticism at the end.
The last chapter, in fact, deals with the place of feminist theory in Lacan,
which is perhaps the most controversial aspect of Lacanian theory. Now,
that's the way we teach our law students to write trial or appellate briefs, or
otherwise to argue to a judge or jury: best arguments first, weakest (or most
controversial) arguments last.
That was 1986. A decade later, I might argue, Lacan has become more
popular, more controversial, and subject to more criticism, so one cannot
begin a book on Lacan today without taking account of the critical context.
However, Mark Bracher, in the current issue of the Journal of the Psycho-
analysis of Culture and Society, introduces Lacan's newly translated lecture
49. See generally ELLIE RAGLAN, LAcAN AND THE PHmOSOPmY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
(1986).
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on criminology without apology or any acknowledgment of Lacan's critics:
"Lacan's paper... functions to clarify, elaborate, or critique many of the
formulations of Freud's book concerning the most fundamental psychological
consequences of civilization, as well as the psychological roots of the most
serious problems facing civilization. " As to the difficulties facing readers
of Lacan, Bracher simply says Lacan speaks "in typically laconic fashion."5
That's it - no apologies, no concerns over Lacan or psychoanalysis or their
utility for social theory.
Douzinas, in his review essay, also reviews Peter Goodrich's Oedipus
Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law,5" and notes favorably that:
Psychoanalytic terms and references litter the text, but nowhere are we
treated to a sustained theoretical discourse as to the importance or rele-
vance of Freud or Lacan for the business of historiography or law. This
may upset the converted. But this low key almost playful approach to
theory coupled with the unargued assumptions about the value of psycho-
analysis seems to lower the critical defenses of the agnostic.53
If unargued assumptions lower the critical defenses of the unconverted, why
would I begin my own book with grave concerns over the reception of Lacan?
My hesitance regarding Lacan, I believe, is not just a ploy to win sup-
port, not just a rhetorical move to gain sympathy or empathy just before I
sneak Lacan the Master into law. Nor is my style of argument an attempted
rejection of rhetoric, as if I "identify rhetoric primarily with ornament,
passion, specious argument, and deceit... ; " I do not. But I do appear
paranoid, because I see problems everywhere. (My defense is the "some-
times a cigar is just a cigar" aphorism, or in terms of Cohen, "sometimes
expressed lack of interest is just lack of interest;" in the case of paranoia,
sometimes everybody really is after you.) Let me briefly outline my concerns.
1. Traditional/Postmodern Tensions
As lawyers, we tend to think in terms of two-sided disputes - plaintiff
and defendant, prosecutor and accused, labor and management, government
50. Mark Bracher, Editor's Column: Lacan's "Civilization and Its Discontents," J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS CULTURE & SOC., Fall 1996, at 1, 1.
51. Id.
52. See generally PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS LEx: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW
(1995).
53. Douzinas, supra note 8, at 334.
54. See J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the
Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIvE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 211,
212 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996).
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and business, and so forth - and of issues with two possible answers. So
it is understandable, if somewhat oversimplified, for me to see contemporary
academic and scholarly discourse in terms of grand debates, each with two
warring factions. Indeed, I often sense a "which side are you on?" mental-
ity, and the notion of a bloodless war of ideas is commonplace. Consider the
ongoing "culture wars," a term of art nowadays, which is represented most
easily by the argument between Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American
Mind,5' which mourned the loss of great books by great men with great
ideas, and the corrective book by Lawrence Levine, The Opening of the
American Mind,56 which in psychoanalytic fashion revealed Bloom's fear to
be not the closing of the American mind but its opening to diverse ideas and
people and theories." Then there is the ongoing division in almost every
discipline of the university between scholars oriented to so-called postmodern
approaches and their critics who fear relativism or nihilism. Some easy
examples include: (1) the debates over cultural studies in English depart-
ments, which enterprise both breaks down disciplinary boundaries and
destabilizes the presumed object of literary study (thus baseball, Madonna,
and cannibalism replace Shakespeare and Dickens, critics point out); 8 (2) the
debates over post-colonial studies, which is for proponents a rich theoretical
orientation focusing on non-western cultures, but is for critics a subdiscipline
with an identity-crisis, with a desire to study "four centuries and most of the
planet as its domain;" 9 and (3) the so-called "science wars," an identifiable
front in the "culture wars," which pits social and literary critics of the
scientific enterprise against those who uphold the rationality and logic of
scientific evidence.6 And, of course, postmodern theory, cultural studies,
post-colonial studies, and science studies are vaguely associated with the
new, the young and the left, while their critics end up sounding traditional
and conservative.
My concern with Lacanian theory is not so much that it is all too
classifiable, for example, as belonging to the postmodernist side of the
culture wars. Rather, my concern is that Lacanian theory tends to fall
55. See generally ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).
56. See generally LAWRENCE LEVINE, THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1996).
57. See Sheldon Hackney, The University Is Not the U.S. Army: A Conversation with
Lawrence W. Levine, HUMANmES, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 4, 5.
58. See Forum, PMLA, Mar. 1997, at 257, 257-86; Marc Wortman, The Coming of
"Cultural Studies," YALE, Apr. 1993, at 27, 27-31.
59. See Russell Jacoby, Marginal Returns: The Trouble with Post-Colonial Theory,
LINGUA FRANCA, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 30, 30.
60. See Michael Albert, Science, Post Modernism, and the Left: Lessons from Alan
Sokal's Parody in Social Text, Z MAGAZINE, July-Aug. 1996, at 64, 64-69.
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through the cracks of contemporary classification schemes. Lacanian theory
is very much like the rental car agencies that compete with Hertz as they are
represented in Hertz's recent television advertising campaign as "not ex-
actly" Hertz. Lacan is "not exactly" traditional or postmodern. Marcia Ian
remarks that while psychoanalysis as a method "can and does enrich the
practice of cultural studies," it "has been accused of knowing little and
caring less about culture."61 Judith Levy finds in post-colonial discourse a
"contradictory and ambivalent response to psychoanalysis," which approach
was completely absent in the recent Post-Colonial Studies Reader.62 With
respect to the critique of science, Lacan was notoriously ambiguous in his
critique of scientism alongside his desire to make psychoanalysis scientific.63
Thus, a tendency persists to view Lacan as part of a tradition in psychoana-
lytic theory that is associated with determinism, with the individual rather
than with culture, and with Western narrow-mindedness.
Nevertheless, if Lacan does not exactly fit on the left in academia, he
certainly doesn't fit traditional modes of analysis in social and literary
theory. Indeed, from the perspective of those who are uncomfortable with
postmodern approaches, Lacan often epitomizes what is most discomforting.
For example, postmodern theorists are frequently accused of using obtuse
terminology, a jargon for insiders, and reading Lacan requires some intro-
duction to his specialized concepts like the other, the imaginary, lack,
jouissance, and the Name-of-the-Father; even familiar terms like desire,
knowledge, and agency take on unfamiliar meanings in Lacan's seminars.
Yet the critic who asks, "why not use familiar terminology and everyday
language?" reveals a certain level of discomfort with one of the primary
lessons of both postmodern and Lacanian theory. Everyday discourse is
already jargonistic; the terms with which we are familiar are a specialized
vocabulary for insiders, and they always limit the possibilities of our dis-
course. Thus, language is not a mode of communication for ideas, but is
itself ideological. That situation would not be so very uncomfortable if
Lacan offered a method for rising above ideology, for finding a meta-dis-
course that was not ideological, but Lacan offers no such hope. The best we
can do is to recognize our place in language and how it constructs us, and
then to choose carefully the discourses in which we are trapped.
61. See Forum, supra note 58, at 279 (Letter from Marcia Ian).
62. See Judith Levy, From Oppression to Repression, from Subjection to Subject, J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS CuLTuRE & Soc., Fall 1996, at 113, 113.
63. See generally David S. Caudill, Why Would a Lacanian Socio-Legal Analyst Care
About Scientific Validity?: A Response to Redding, 75 OR. L. REv. 811 (1996).
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IDENTIFYING LAWS UNCONSCIOUS
I hope that explains a bit more clearly why a Lacanian theorist might be
modest - self-analysis is always part of the practice of psychoanalysis. That
is why psychoanalysts are always subjected to analysis as part of their
training. But is that enough? Is psychoanalysis an appropriate mode of self-
critical reflection? Lacan's place in the psychoanalytic tradition, signifi-
cantly, is also problematical for critics of postmodern theory. Some tradi-
tional theorists admire Freud, because he promises a method for getting
control of one's life. Lacan's notions that we are caught up in relations of
identification with others, in addition to our relations with language, are
troubling to traditional Freudians. On the other hand, those traditional
theorists who have rejected Freud as outdated and unscientific find enough
Freud in Lacan to reject Lacan.
Now, perhaps you can see what I'm worried about. Lacan stands for -
is a token for - too many things. For postmodern theorists, Lacan often
represents a traditional approach to knowledge - Lacan is a Freudian to the
extent that he believes we can identify our place in language, that we can
trace the effects of other people and of culture and of law, not simply on our
otherwise independent selves, but in constructing or constituting our highly
dependent selves. Just when you think that at least the Freudians would
appreciate Lacan, however, Lacan's notion of the limits of psychoanalysis
is too postmodern. And for traditional theorists, Freudian or not, Lacan
represents what is wrong with postmodernism - confusing jargon, the
disappearing self, determinative and ideological language, and relativism.
I agree, however, with Thomas Brockelman that:
reducing Lacan to such a token, to a marker for a certain radical stance -
whether "modernist" or "postmodernist" - empties his work of its origi-
nality. Moreover, not only does such a reduction foreclose any real access
to Lacanian psychoanalysis, it also cuts off the possibility that Lacan might
be seen to offer an alternative to the facile understandings of "modernism"
and "postmodernism" shared today by critics and advocates of the
postmodem alike. In other words, we lose the possibility that Lacan might
actually teach us something important about the contemporary world.64
2. Lacan the Person
Why can't we leave well alone? Why aren't the books enough?
Flaubert wanted them to be: few writers believed more in the objectivity
of the written text and the insignificance of the writer's personality; yet
still we disobediently pursue.6
64. Thomas Brockelman, Lacan and Modernism: Representation and Its Vicissitudes,
in DISSEMINATING LACAN 207, 207-08 (D. Pettigrew & Franuois Raffoul eds., 1996).
65. JULIAN BARNEs, FLAUBERT'S PARROT 12 (1990).
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As more and more work is being done concerning Lacanian theory, the
personal attacks multiply. Without confirming or denying the distasteful
aspects of his life, I tend to focus on the texts of his seminars. That is
sometimes difficult, because numerous scholars challenge Lacan (and some-
times his followers, like me) as a fraud, a charlatan, and so forth, but
reading Lacan's work is like reading anybody's work - some of it is com-
pelling and useful, some of it less so. I do not focus, as Halperin does with
respect to Foucault,6 on the "phobic constructions" of Lacan and their
significance, though an argument could be made that Lacan is a threat. Yet
even as I try to ignore personal attacks on Lacan, they influence my work.
I know that I am dealing with an offensive figure, whether personally or
theoretically offensive, and I become circumspect about the terms Master,
Disciple, and so forth. Who wants to be a disciple? Who wants to have a
master? Nobody. Yet we're all disciples of some master(s), and we'd best
be self-critical.
III. Conclusion
In a symposium on Lacan, I realize that I have revealed far too little
about Lacan and, probably, far too much about myself - my concerns, my
emotional attachment to Lacanian theory. I probably couldn't have fooled
you anyway. If I had forcefully argued for Lacan's unproblematic entry into
legal education, I might have slipped by saying "Fraud" instead of "Freud,"
or otherwise looked over my shoulder for those who are after me.
66. See HALPERIN, supra note 1, at 6.
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